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Highlights 
 Auction fever research has only considered the effects of integral arousal. 
 We show that incidental arousal also increases bidding. 
 Bidders are unaware of the effects of incidental arousal on bidding.  
 Our research explains what causes auction fever and why it persists. 
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Abstract 
Despite countless anecdotes about emotionally-charged bidding in auctions, there is little 
research to help understand what causes auction fever and why it persists. Because research has 
only considered how integral arousal (i.e., arousal from within the auction) affects bidding, the 
current research considered whether incidental arousal (i.e., arousal from outside the auction) 
also increases bidding. With two different manipulations of arousal, Experiments 1 and 2 showed 
that incidental arousal increased bidding in live auctions with monetary stakes. Experiment 1 
also measured arousal physiologically to demonstrate its role in bidding. Experiment 3 utilized a 
third manipulation of incidental arousal and found that individuals were unaware of its effects. 
Overall, the current research demonstrates how bidders are potentially subject to many different 
sources of arousal that have nothing to do with auctions, all of which can unwittingly increase 
individuals’ bidding. 
 
Keywords: Arousal; Auctions; Economic Exchange; Heart Rate 
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Perhaps nowhere on the planet is the combination of art, power and glamour quite 
so heady. Attend one of Sotheby’s standing-room-only auctions of Impressionist 
and modern art, and you will feel, if only by association, the adrenalin rush 
triggered by high-stakes bidding. (Prince, 1999, p. 171-172)  
 
The opening quote suggests anecdotally that auction bidding can involve significant 
levels of arousal (i.e., sympathetic activation of the autonomic nervous system, Schachter & 
Singer, 1962). These observations have led to the concept of “auction fever” or “the emotionally 
charged and frantic behavior of auction participants that can result in overbidding” (Ku, 
Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005, p. 90). Research has empirically demonstrated the existence of 
auction fever (Jones, 2011; Ku et al., 2005). For instance, Jones (2011) observed that final prices 
for 41.1% of eBay auctions for Amazon.com gift certificates exceeded the certificates’ face 
value. Research has also examined when auction fever occurs, focusing on how elements 
inherent to auctions stimulate arousal, which then increases bidding (Adam, Krämer, & Müller, 
2015; Ku et al., 2005; Malhotra, 2010).  
Auctions have become increasingly important, both theoretically and practically. 
Economists (for reviews, see Kagel, 1995; McAfee & McMillan, 1987) have studied how and 
when auctions can efficiently establish market prices. However, economists have generally shied 
away from examining the emotional factors involved in auction fever. Instead, economists 
typically adopt an assumption of rationality, i.e., that bidders make economically rational 
decisions (McAfee & McMillan, 1987; Vickrey, 1961). As a result, the very existence of auction 
fever is disputed (e.g., Boehnke, 2013; Lee & Malmendier, 2011) and recent research on auction 
fever fails to mention arousal (e.g., Ehrhart, Ott, & Abele, 2015). In contrast, despite their 
expertise in examining the effects of emotions, psychologists have typically had little interest in 
understanding auctions (for exceptions, see Ball, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1991; Bazerman & 
Samuelson, 1983; Foreman & Murnighan, 1996; Ku, Galinsky, & Murnighan, 2006; Ku et al., 
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2005; Malhotra, 2010; Murnighan, 2002). The result is that there is a lack of theory around what 
causes auction fever and why it persists.  
This is concerning because auctions are ubiquitous. Competitive tendering processes in 
governmental and industrial contracts are fundamentally auctions. Similarly, the auction of 
government bonds, the emergence of eBay, housing auctions, and increased corporate 
acquisitions have all made auctions more than just a forum for the sale of art and antiques. Thus, 
auction fever can have significant financial repercussions. Importantly, we do not suggest that 
the effects of arousal on bidding are “good” or “bad”. For instance, arousal-induced bidding may 
be “good” from the seller’s perspective or “bad” from the buyer’s perspective. Instead, the 
current research focuses on understanding what causes auction fever and why it persists.  
Specifically, although extant literature has focused on how elements inherent to auctions 
fuel integral arousal and bidding, we examine whether incidental arousal, i.e., arousal generated 
outside the auction context, also increases bidding. If so, bidders could be affected by many 
different sources of arousal, including ambient music (Bernardi, Porta, & Sleight, 2005; Gorn, 
Pham, & Sin, 2001), wall colors (Valdez & Mehrabian, 1994), posters or paintings (Kurdi, 
Lozano, & Banaji, 2017), as well as whether they have recently been to the gym (Kim & Baron, 
1988) or had an espresso (Barry et al., 2005). We further suggest that, consistent with work that 
individuals are not necessarily aware of relevant information that can affect their decision-
making (e.g., Chugh & Bazerman, 2007; Gilbert & Wilson, 2000; Neisser, 1979), individuals are 
unaware of the effects of incidental arousal on bidding, making guarding against arousal more 
difficult and making increased bidding more likely.  
Arousal and Auction Fever 
Research has explored the effects of arousal across a range of decision-making tasks and 
domains (for reviews, see Peters, Västfjäll, Gärling, & Slovic, 2006; Rick & Loewenstein, 2008). 
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On one hand, arousal is an essential guide for human decision-making (Bechara & Damasio, 
2005; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997) and arousal can improve task performance 
under certain circumstances (Brown & Curhan, 2013; Zajonc, 1965). For instance, experiencing 
arousal in response to monetary losses is critical for making advantageous financial decisions 
(Bechara & Damasio, 2005). On the other hand, arousal can narrow attentional capacity, limit 
information processing, and reduce cognitive flexibility (Easterbrook, 1959; Lewinsohn & 
Mano, 1993; Mano, 1992; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). For instance, compared to low 
arousal, high arousal is linked to increased risk taking (Mano, 1991) and greater loss aversion 
(Sokol-Hessner et al., 2008). 
There has been some research on the role of arousal in auctions and auction fever. Ku, et 
al. (2005) proposed a competitive arousal model that highlighted how features inherent to 
auctions (e.g., rivalry, time pressure, presence of an audience) can stimulate arousal and increase 
bidding. For instance, the authors reported research that time pressure increases arousal (Maule, 
Hockey, & Bdzola, 2000) and reduces cognitive deliberation (Ordóñez & Benson, 1997). 
Similarly, Malhotra (2010) manipulated two antecedents of arousal – rivalry and time pressure – 
and found that they fueled a desire to win (even when winning was costly and provided no 
advantage), which then increased bidding. Finally, using physiological measurements, Adam, et 
al. (2015) showed that competition and time pressure increased arousal and bids. According to 
the competitive arousal model, auction fever occurs because increased arousal can “impair calm, 
careful decision-making” (Ku et al., 2005, p. 92). 
Although this research is consistent with the anecdotal evidence on auction fever, it has 
only examined the role of integral arousal, i.e., arousal generated from the auction context. Thus, 
we do not know if incidental arousal, i.e., arousal generated outside the auction context, also 
affects bidding. Abundant research has robustly demonstrated that integral and incidental arousal 
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have consistent effects (e.g., Pham, 2007; Rick & Loewenstein, 2008). For instance, integral and 
incidental arousal similarly affected negotiators – arousal benefited negotiators when they had a 
positive attitude towards negotiations but harmed negotiators when they had a negative attitude 
(Brown & Curhan, 2013). As such, we hypothesize that incidental arousal will increase bidding.1 
If incidental arousal increases bidding, this may help to explain why auction fever is not 
uncommon: not only are bidders subject to arousal from elements integral to auctions, they may 
also experience arousal from a myriad of other, non-auction elements, including music (Bernardi 
et al., 2005; Gorn et al., 2001), color (Valdez & Mehrabian, 1994), images (Kurdi et al., 2017), 
exercise (Kim & Baron, 1988), caffeine (Barry et al., 2005), crossing shaky bridges (Dutton & 
Aron, 1974), and hearing violent stories (White, Fishbein, & Rutstein, 1981). 
Using two different manipulations of incidental arousal, Experiments 1 and 2 investigated 
whether incidental arousal increases bidding in real auctions with monetary stakes. To further 
clarify the role of arousal, Experiment 1 measured arousal physiologically. 
Awareness of Incidental Arousal’s Effects 
We further argue that individuals are unaware of incidental arousal’s effects on bidding, 
making guarding against arousal’s effects ever more difficult. 
Much research has examined how individuals are unaware of factors that affect their 
decisions (for a review, see Bazerman & Sezer, 2016). For instance, Neisser (1979) first 
demonstrated individuals’ inattentional blindness: when participants focused on counting 
basketball passes, they ignored information that was otherwise blatantly obvious – a woman with 
an open umbrella walking among the basketball players. Similarly, Chugh and Bazerman (2007) 
referred to individuals’ bounded awareness in describing how individuals ignore easily 
observable and relevant information. Finally, focalism refers to the tendency to focus too much 
attention on a particular event, while ignoring other concurrent events (Gilbert & Wilson, 2000). 
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Applying this body of research to auctions, bidders may be unaware of the effects of incidental 
arousal on bidding. If so, this would further clarify the causes and persistence of auction fever. 
With a third manipulation of incidental arousal, Experiment 3 examined whether 
incidental arousal affects bidding even though individuals are unaware of this. 
Experiment 1: Competitive, Incidental Arousal 
Experiment 1 examined whether incidental arousal increases bidding and final prices in 
two live auctions that had financial consequences. Importantly, we measured arousal 
physiologically to provide evidence that our manipulation induced arousal and that arousal 
affects bidding. We also manipulated the monetary stakes (low and high) to test whether stakes 
moderated these effects. 
Method 
Participants and design. We used the Online Recruitment System for Economic 
Experiments (ORSEE) system (Greiner, 2015) to recruit 144 undergraduates (112 men, 32 
women) at a German university.2 Participants were compensated €10 plus their earnings from the 
arousal and auction tasks. Measurements failed (e.g., electrodes detached) or noise in the signal 
prevented accurate identification of the intervals between subsequent heart beats for 26 
participants, who were equally distributed across the low- and high-arousal conditions. These 
common measurement problems reduced the final sample to 118 participants (92 men; 26 
women). The experiment had a 2 (arousal: low, high) x 2 (stakes: low, high) mixed design with 
repeated measures on the second factor.  
Procedure. Participants sat at individual cubicles with computer monitors. The auction 
procedures were implemented using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) and the incidental 
arousal induction task was implemented in Java. After attaching the electrodes, participants 
received instructions about the auction task and participated in two trial rounds with hypothetical 
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payoffs to ensure that they understood the rules and procedures. They then proceeded to the 
arousal induction task and, finally, to the two real auctions. 
Arousal induction. To manipulate arousal, participants engaged in a 10-minute symbol-
matching task: a five-symbol sequence appeared on the screen and participants had to choose the 
correct sequence from a list.  
The high-arousal condition involved time pressure (Ku et al., 2005), competition (Ku et 
al., 2005), and energizing music (Bernardi et al., 2005) that was played throughout the task. 
Participants chose from 20-symbol sequences and had 7 seconds to make each decision. They 
received 20 points for every correct choice, lost 10 points for every incorrect choice, and lost 30 
points if they took more than 7 seconds to make a choice. Participants’ final payoffs depended on 
their relative performance, which was not revealed until the end of the experiment. Thus, after 
the auctions, the participant with the most points received €15; the second best participant 
received €12; the third best received €9, etc. Although participants competed against one 
another, the instructions pushed them to focus on the symbol-matching task. Additionally, 
participants did not interact with each other and received no information that would allow for 
social comparisons. 
In the low-arousal condition, participants listened to soothing “spa” music. They chose 
from only 5-symbol sequences and had twice as much time (14 seconds) to make each decision. 
Their task performance did not affect their payoffs. Instead, to match their expected payoffs with 
those in the high-arousal condition, participants were told that they would roll a die at the end of 
the experiment for an additional payoff (from €0 to €15).  
Auctions. Participants next engaged in two auctions, each with two other bidders. 
Because we were interested in the impact of incidental arousal, we minimized any arousal that a 
bidding-rebidding process might stimulate. Thus, participants bid on jars of money (i.e., items 
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that have an objective value, which is unknown to bidders at the time of bidding) in two 
auctions, in which each bidder made a single secret bid and the highest bidder won the item for 
the amount bid (also known as first-price sealed-bid auctions, Vickrey, 1961).  
Stakes manipulation. The jars included low and high monetary totals, presented in 
random order. Low-stakes jars contained 1- and 2-cent coins, totaling €2.37; high-stakes jars 
contained 5- and 10-cent coins, totaling €11.85. Before placing their bid, participants could 
examine the jar. The values of the jars and auction results were revealed after the second round. 
If a participant won, they received a payoff of the true value of the jar minus the amount bid. 
Physiological measurement of arousal. Participants wore chest straps (Movisens Chest 
Belt EcgMove) with dry-electrodes to provide an electrocardiogram (ECG; Bioplux Researcher) 
for information on the electrical activity of the heart. A beat detection program (Open ANSLAB) 
was used in offline analysis to detect R peaks in the raw digitized ECG. From this, an interbeat 
interval series was created and hand-corrected for artifacts. Focusing on participants’ 
cardiovascular activity during the last minute of the symbol-matching task, we used Allen, 
Chambers, and Towers’ (2007) CMetX tool to calculate a cardiac sympathetic index (CSI, 
Toichi, Sugiura, Murai, & Sengoku, 1997), which reflected sympathetic activation of the 
autonomic nervous system in response to the arousal induction task.  
Bids and final prices. We recorded participants’ two bids and calculated the final price 
for each auction. We standardized bids and final prices within the stakes conditions.3 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. As predicted, participants in the high-arousal condition exhibited 
more arousal as measured by CSI (M=3.52, SD=.21) than did participants in the low-arousal 
condition (M=2.80, SD=.12, t(116)=2.94, p=.004, d=.541, CI95%=[.24, 1.21]). 
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Bids and final prices. A 2 (arousal: low, high) x 2 (stakes: low, high) repeated measures 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on participants’ standardized bids with auction order as a 
covariate, led to a significant main effect for arousal (F(1, 116)=10.90, p=.001, η2p=.087, 
CI95%=[.21, .83]). Participants in the high-arousal condition (M=.26, SD=1.04) bid significantly 
higher than those in the low-arousal condition (M=-.26, SD=.88). The arousal x stakes 
interaction (F(1, 116)=.78, p=.38, η2p=.007) and the auction order covariate (F(1, 116)=.00, 
p=.952, η2p<.001) were not significant.  
We also assessed whether arousal affected final prices. A 2 (arousal: low, high) x 2 
(stakes: low, high) repeated measures ANCOVA on standardized final prices with auction order 
as a covariate found that high-arousal (M=.21, SD=1.11) led to marginally higher standardized 
final prices than low-arousal (M=-.21, SD=.82) did (F(1,45)=3.44, p=.070, η2p=.024). Neither the 
arousal x stakes interaction (F(1, 45)=.01, p=.931, η2p<.001) nor the auction order covariate (F(1, 
45)=.61, p=.438, η2p=.004) were significant. On average, the difference between the high- and 
low-arousal conditions was €.46 and €.96 in the low- and high-stakes conditions (19.4% and 
8.1% of the value of the jar) respectively. 4 
Consistent with our theorizing, Experiment 1 showed that incidental arousal increased 
bidding in auctions with real monetary consequences. Importantly, we provided clear evidence 
that our manipulation induced arousal by using a well-established measure of sympathetic 
activation of the autonomous nervous system. 
Experiment 2: Non-Competitive, Incidental Arousal in Auctions 
Although Experiment 1 manipulated incidental arousal, it still focused on competitive 
experiences, i.e., arousal may have resulted from the social competition in the manipulation. To 
test whether arousal that was unrelated to both competition and auctions would still influence 
Running head: AROUSAL AND AUCTIONS          12 
bidding, we sought a manipulation that was both distal from the auction context and as subtle as 
possible. Thus, Experiment 2 induced cognitive dissonance.  
When people act in a way that contradicts their beliefs, they experience cognitive 
dissonance, which is a state of psychological discomfort, tension, or arousal (Cooper & Fazio, 
1984; Elkin & Leippe, 1986; Festinger, 1957; Kiesler & Pallak, 1976). Importantly, research 
demonstrated that experiencing cognitive dissonance increases nonspecific skin conductance, a 
physiological measure of arousal (Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Elkin & Leippe, 1986; Losch & 
Cacioppo, 1990). Additionally, dissonance influences task performance in ways similar to other 
arousal states (Cooper, Zanna, & Taves, 1978; Pallak & Pittman, 1972; Zanna & Cooper, 1974). 
Thus, leveraging off this research, we induced cognitive dissonance in participants to create 
incidental arousal. 
Because the perception of choice in performing a counterattitudinal behavior is a key 
driver of dissonance and the arousal that results from it (Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Croyle & 
Cooper, 1983), Experiment 2 manipulated whether participants had the choice to engage in 
counterattitudinal advocacy, after which they bid in Experiment 1’s low stakes (€2.37) auction. 
We hypothesized that the arousing cognitive dissonance from having choice in writing a 
counterattitudinal essay would increase bidding.  
Method 
Participants and design. We used the ORSEE system (Greiner, 2015) to recruit 150 
undergraduates (102 men, 48 women) at a German university. Participants were compensated 
€12 plus their individual earnings from the auction task. The experiment had two between-
participants conditions: no vs. high choice in writing a counterattitudinal essay. Five participants 
in the high-choice condition refused to write the essay, resulting in a final sample of 145 
undergraduates (101 men; 44 women). 
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Procedure. As in Experiment 1, participants sat at isolated cubicles with computer 
monitors, were introduced to the auction task, and bid in one trial auction with hypothetical 
payoffs and computerized opponents.  
Next, as part of the dissonance induction, we asked participants for their opinions on the 
issue of introducing tuition fees. This issue was topical, familiar, and commonly debated. 
Participants indicated whether they were for or against tuition fees and reported how strongly 
they held their opinion (from 1 “not at all” to 7 “very much so”). Next, they all wrote a 
counterattitudinal essay, i.e., those who supported tuition fees wrote against them and vice versa. 
Dissonance induction. We induced dissonance by manipulating whether participants had 
a choice in writing their counterattitudinal essay (Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Croyle & Cooper, 
1983). No-choice instructions indicated, “You have been assigned to write a list of arguments in 
favor of/against [depending on their initial opinion] introducing tuition fees of €750 per semester 
for each student. Therefore, you must argue in support of/against introducing tuition fees.” The 
high-choice instructions indicated, “While we would like to stress the voluntary nature of your 
decision regarding which side of the issue to write on, we would like you to list arguments in 
favor of/against introducing tuition fees of €750 per semester for each student. Although you are 
under no obligation to write this, it would be very helpful for us.” High-choice participants 
provided written consent to confirm their willingness to write the essay. All essays started with: 
“I believe that the State of Baden-Württemberg should/should not introduce tuition fees of 750 € 
per semester for each student because …”. 
Finally, participants bid in one auction against two other participants, for the jar of 1- and 
2-cent coins, worth €2.37. 
Bids and final prices. We recorded participants’ bid, and because participants bid within 
three-person groups, we also calculated the auction final price.5  
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Results and Discussion 
Most participants (122; 84%) were opposed to introducing tuition fees. When controlling 
for participants’ initial opinions, all effects listed below remain significant; for simplicity, we 
report results without this covariate. 
As predicted, high-choice participants (M=€1.98, SD=€.86) bid higher than no-choice 
participants (M=€1.62, SD=€.74) did (t(143)=2.74, p=.007, d=.46, CI95%=[.10, .62]). We found 
the same pattern for final prices: high-choice (M=€2.75, SD=€.67) led to higher final prices than 
no-choice (M=€2.38, SD=€.55) did (t(48)=2.14, p=.038, d=.61, CI95%=[.22, .72]).  
Experiment 2 provided clear evidence that arousal that is unrelated to competition, and as 
distal as cognitive dissonance, can increase bidding and final prices.  
Experiment 3: Awareness of the Effects of Non-Competitive, Incidental Arousal 
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that two different operationalizations of incidental arousal 
increased bidding and final prices (marginally in Experiment 1 and significantly in Experiment 
2). Using a third manipulation of incidental arousal, Experiment 3 examined whether bidders are 
aware of arousal’s effects (Bazerman & Sezer, 2016). 
Method 
Participants and design. We recruited 369 participants (105 men, 264 women) who 
resided in England through Prolific Academic in exchange for £1.00. Prolific Academic is a 
reliable online recruitment pool with participants who are more honest and naïve to common 
measures than other online platforms (Peer, Samat, Brandimarte, & Acquisti, 2017). Data from 
108 participants who failed attention checks6 were excluded. Based on an outlier analysis, data 
from 26 participants were excluded because their bids deviated more than 1.5 times the 
interquartile range from the upper quartile. The final sample included 235 participants (62 men; 
173 women). The experiment had two between-participants conditions: low vs. high arousal.  
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Procedure. The procedure mimicked that of Experiments 1 and 2 but participants bid 
online. They were informed that we were interested in understanding individuals’ abilities to 
multi-task, which provided a cover story as participants switched between tasks. As a sound test, 
participants first answered two questions with audio instructions. To increase engagement and to 
simulate the presence of other bidders, participants were asked to create a bidder profile by 
selecting a bidder name and avatar. As in Experiments 1 and 2, participants were next introduced 
to the auction task, and bid in one trial auction with hypothetical payoffs and computerized 
opponents. They were then informed that they would be bidding in a real auction, against 2 
actual bidders and with real payouts. In reality, participants simply submitted bids without the 
opportunity to actually interact with other bidders or win the auction. 
Arousal induction. We next manipulated arousal by asking participants to engage in an 
“image recognition task” that involved viewing and subsequently recognizing 14 images7 
selected from Kurdi et al.’s (2017) Open Affective Standardized Image Set (OASIS) while 
listening to music (Bernardi et al., 2005; Gorn et al., 2001). Each image was shown for 5 
seconds, with a 1-second blank screen between images, resulting in a 90-second task. We chose 
to manipulate arousal via both images and music to provide a strong manipulation, given the 
online setting. The low-arousal condition included images of stationery, walls, pebbles, and Q-
tips, as well as Experiment 1’s calming music. The high-arousal condition included images of 
fire, lighting, injuries, a roller coaster ride, a shark, and a kissing couple as well as Experiment 
1’s energetic music.  
Auction. Participants then returned to the bidding task where they saw a picture of a jar 
(with dimensions) of 1 pence coins. Unbeknown to participants, the jar contained £.82. Next, on 
the bidding screen, the image of the jar was repeated, together with two bidder profiles of the 
ostensible opponents. Participants were asked to indicate a bid for the money in the jar.  
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Measures. To understand participants’ bidding rationale, they were asked, in an open-
ended question, to describe the factors that affected their bid decision. Participants also 
responded to 10 questions (from 1 “not at all” to 7 “very much so”) about what they thought 
about and focused on during their bidding. These questions included items about the image 
recognition task as well as items on bidding motives commonly identified in extant literature (see 
Table 1 for items). We conducted a principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation. 
Four items loaded onto the first factor (27.56% of variance) and were averaged to form an index 
about winning (=.85). Three items loaded onto the second factor (20.72% of variance) and were 
average to form an index about the image recognition task (=.77). Although the three remaining 
items formed the final factor (14.06% of variance), they showed poor inter-item reliability 
(=.36) and were analyzed separately. 
Next, participants described their emotions during the image recognition task using 4 
items on 7-point scales (“very calm”/“very aroused”, “very peaceful”/“very energized”, “very 
inactive”/“very active”, and “very unhappy”/“very happy”). The first three items were average to 
form an arousal index (=.75).  
Finally, participants answered 6 questions to determine if they recognized the images and 
music from the manipulation as well as 1 question about their bidding counterparts in the money 
auction (e.g., 2 or 3 bidders, computers or human). Participants were then informed that they lost 
the auction and responded to demographic questions. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. As predicted, high-arousal participants (M=3.71, SD=.99) reported 
feeling more aroused, energized, and active than low-arousal participants (M=2.54, SD=.97) did 
(t(1, 233)=9.21, p <.001, d=1.20, CI95%=[.92, 1.43]). Because high-arousal participants (M=3.55, 
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SD=.95) also reported feeling less happy than low-arousal participants (M=4.52, SD=.87) did 
(t(1, 233)=8.16, p <.001, d=1.06, CI95%=[-1.20, -.73]), our main analyses controlled for the 
effects of happiness to isolate the manipulation’s effect on arousal. 
Main analyses. First, and consistent with Experiments 1 and 2’s findings, high-arousal 
participants (M=.90, SD=.71) bid more for the jar of coins than low-arousal participants (M=.81, 
SD=.65) did (F(1, 232)=4.67, p =.032, η2p=.02, CI95%=[.02, .41]). 
We also wanted to examine individuals’ awareness of how incidental arousal affected 
their bidding. The first two authors coded participants’ open-ended responses to the factors that 
affected their bidding (see Table 2 for categories, sample responses, and instances of mention by 
condition), resolving any discrepancies through discussion. With a series of logistic regressions 
while controlling for participants’ happiness, we found no significant differences in how often 
each factor was mentioned by participants in the low- and high-arousal conditions (all 
Wald’s<2.44, p’s>.12). Interestingly, no one mentioned their emotions or the image recognition 
task.  
Finally, we analyzed participants’ responses to the questions on what they thought about 
and focused on during bidding (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). While controlling for the 
effects of happiness, high-arousal participants were marginally less likely to focus on estimating 
the value of the coins than low-arousal participants were (F(1, 232)=3.42, p =.066, η2p=.02, 
CI95%=[-.02, .64]). Low- and high-arousal participants did not differ on any of the other factors 
(all F’s<.2.49, p’s>.12), including the image recognition task. Indeed, both low- (M=2.14, 
SD=1.24) and high- (M=2.25, SD=1.28) arousal participants rated the image recognition task as 
having very little effect on their bidding and the image recognition task was the least considered 
category.  
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With a third manipulation of incidental arousal, Experiment 3 demonstrated again that 
incidental arousal increases bids. However, novel to Experiment 3, we showed that participants 
were unaware of the impact of incidental arousal. 
General Discussion 
Despite anecdotes about emotionally-charged bidding, little research has explored the 
causes and persistence of auction fever. Because previous research has only focused on integral 
arousal, the current research considered whether incidental arousal also increases bidding. 
Consistent with our hypotheses, we demonstrated that incidental arousal increases bidding 
(Experiments 1-3) and final prices (marginally in Experiment 1 and significantly in Experiment 
2). Additionally, Experiment 3 demonstrated that individuals were unaware of the effects of 
incidental arousal. Importantly, Experiments 1 and 2 involved real auctions with monetary stakes 
and Experiment 1 measured arousal physiologically.  
Theoretical Contributions and Future Research 
The current research contributes to our theoretical understanding of the role of arousal in 
auction bidding. First, we show that incidental arousal, like integral arousal, increases bidding. 
Thus, although Ku, et al. (2005) focused on arousal from auction-related features (e.g., time 
pressure, rivalry), our research clarifies that arousal-induced bidding can emerge from non-
auction sources and even from arousal that has nothing to do with competition, i.e., cognitive 
dissonance (Experiment 2) as well as images and music (Experiment 3). Second, consistent with 
much research that shows that individuals are often unaware of relevant factors and information 
that affect their decisions (Bazerman & Sezer, 2016), we show that individuals are unaware of 
the effects of incidental arousal on bidding. Together, the current research helps to explain what 
causes auction fever and why it persists – individuals can be subject to a host of arousal sources 
Running head: AROUSAL AND AUCTIONS          19 
that are unrelated to the auction, which increase their bidding without their awareness, making 
avoiding the effects of arousal ever more difficult. 
Although not central to our hypothesizing, it is noteworthy that our research also provides 
the first causal evidence that arousal affects auction bidding. Despite anecdotal evidence about 
auction fever, there is actually no conclusive evidence for a causal relationship between arousal 
and bids. By manipulating incidental arousal, we were able to demonstrate that arousal increases 
bidding. Additionally, only one paper has used physiological measurements to analyze the role 
of arousal in auction fever (Adam et al., 2015). By measuring arousal physiologically, we 
provide further evidence for the role of arousal in auction fever. As such, our research also 
clarifies that auction fever is a psychologically valid phenomenon. 
Despite basing our theorizing on the competitive arousal model’s perspective that arousal 
impairs bid decisions (Ku et al., 2005), our research is unable to specify an exact mechanism for 
how arousal affects bidding. At a high level, arousal should guide bidders by allowing them to 
anticipate the potential gains and losses associated with bids (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; 
Bechara et al., 1997). However, at a more detailed level, we do not know how exactly arousal 
impacts bid decisions. Does arousal alter risk taking (Mano, 1991) or how bidders process 
information (Lewinsohn & Mano, 1993)? For instance, in Experiment 3, participants in the high-
arousal condition were marginally less likely to focus on estimating the value of the coins than 
were low-arousal participants, suggesting that high arousal altered information processing.  
Alternatively, much research has shown that arousal affects individuals through an 
attributional process, where people attribute their arousal to environmental stimuli, even non-
causal environmental stimuli (Dutton & Aron, 1974; Schachter & Singer, 1962). Thus, in 
auctions, arousal could affect bidding, not through an impairment process (Ku et al., 2005), but 
through an attributional process. Two attributional processes can be hypothesized. On one hand, 
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arousal could be attributed to interest in the item (e.g. Dutton & Aron, 1974; White et al., 1981), 
which could then increase willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the item. On the other hand, arousal 
could be attributed to elements in auctions, which inherently involve social competition for a 
scarce resource. Answering these attributional questions would not only clarify how arousal 
affects bidding but may also help to clarify whether the “fever” in auction fever represents a 
more general form of purchasing fever or whether it is specific to auctions.  
Practical Contributions  
Practically, auction organizers should do all that they can to stimulate arousal as any form 
of arousal can increase bidding. Auction organizers may already be aware of this. Thoroughbred 
auctions, for instance, hype the event via glamour (people wear tuxedos and formal gowns), 
employ bid spotters who roam the crowd, and use social pressure to encourage additional 
bidding. Our research suggests that auction organizers may also consider other ways of inducing 
(incidental) arousal, such as arousal-inducing beverages and upbeat music.  
From the bidder perspective, future research should consider how to help individuals 
avoid auction fever. For instance, because arousal can be attributed to non-causal stimuli (Dutton 
& Aron, 1974), bidders could learn to attribute their arousal to alternate sources, and therefore, 
not overbid. Biofeedback may also help individuals to be aware of their arousal levels and avoid 
undesirable decisions (Astor, Adam, Jerčić, Schaaff, & Weinhardt, 2013).  
Conclusion 
The current research demonstrated that incidental arousal, even arousal that had nothing 
to do with competition, increased bidding in auctions, without individuals’ awareness. As such, 
we help to explain what causes auction fever and why it persists.  
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Table 1 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Questions on what Participants Thought about and 
Focused on During the Bidding 
Index Items Low Arousal High Arousal 
Winning I focused on winning the 
money auction; I focused 
on beating the other 
bidders; I focused on not 
losing the money 
auction; it was important 
to me to not lose the 
money auction 
4.40 (1.54) 4.20 (1.42) 
Image recognition task My emotions from the 
image recognition task 
affected my bid decision; 
I focused on how the 
image recognition task 
made me feel; I focused 
on remembering the 
images from the image 
recognition task 
2.14 (1.24) 2.25 (1.28) 
 I focused on estimating 
how much money was in 
the jar 
6.15 (1.05) 5.82 (1.22) 
 I was just guessing at a 
bid 
3.62 (1.67) 3.44 (1.59) 
 I focused on not paying 
too much 
4.95 (1.77) 4.98 (1.64) 
 
Note. Participants indicated the extent to which the items affected their bidding on 7-point scales 
(1 “not at all” to 7 “very much so”).
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Table 2 
Participants’ Open-Ended Responses to Factors that Affected their Bidding 
Category Sample Response Low Arousal 
(N=122) 
High Arousal 
(N=113) 
Estimation of coins’ 
value 
There did not appear to 
be much money in the jar
113 (92.6%) 103 (91.2%) 
Estimation of jar’s value I think there’s around £1 
in the jar and the jar also 
looks nice 
15 (12.3%) 11 (9.7%) 
Rarity of object For pennies – I thought 
that some may be 
collectable 
2 (1.6%) 0 (0.0%) 
Desire to win the 
auction/beat the other 
bidders 
How much money I 
thought was in the jar, 
and going fairly close to 
it to try and win 
11 (9.0%) 16 (14.2%) 
Desire to not 
overbid/retain a surplus 
No. of coins visible, 
desire to make a profit 
46 (37.7%) 33 (29.2%) 
Just guessing Just a guess at the 
amount 
3 (2.5%) 1 (.9%) 
Strategic bidding taking 
into account others’ bids 
Estimated value of what 
item was worth.  
Tendency to go to round 
numbers so I added 1p. 
3 (2.5%) 10 (8.8%) 
Lack of interest in item Wasn’t worth bidding 
on. 
1 (.8%) 3 (2.7%) 
Other Idk [I don’t know.] 5 (4.1%) 1 (.9%) 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Some research has examined the effects of incidental moods on bidding, finding that positive 
moods increase bids compared to negative moods (Capra, Lanier, & Meer, 2012; De Silvaa, 
Pownall, & Wolk, 2012). However, there has been no research examining the effects of 
incidental arousal on bidding, which is the focus of the current research. 
2 We determined the sample size for Experiments 1 and 2 using GPower (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, 
& Buchner, 2007). Assuming an effect size of d=.50, alpha=.05, and power=.80, the analysis 
indicated a sample of 128 participants. No additional participants were run after initial analyses. 
Experiment 1 included a fixed number of 24 data collection sessions with 6 participants each (12 
sessions per condition; 144 participants in total). For Experiment 2, we anticipated that a small 
number of participants would refuse to write the counterattitudinal essay in the high-choice 
condition. Thus, we included 13 sessions for the high-choice condition. For Experiment 3, we 
assumed a smaller effect size of d=.40 (given the online setting), alpha=.05, and power=.80, 
which indicated a sample size of 200. We needed to recruit additional participants after initial 
analyses because numerous participants failed the attention checks. 
3 Participants also completed a questionnaire about their perceptions of the auction as well as 
various scales (e.g., risk preferences, competitiveness). Additional information about these data 
is available from the authors by request. 
4 We conducted a mediation analysis to explore whether arousal as measured by CSI mediated 
the effect of the incidental arousal manipulation on bids. Using Hicks and Tingley’s (2011) 
MEDEFF macro in Stata 14 (which uses robust standard errors clustered by participant to 
account for the repeated measures nature of the stakes variable), the analysis did not yield a 
significant indirect effect of arousal (IE=-.046, LL=-.163, UL=.028). The reason for this is 
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unclear but might be explained by the between-participants variability of the CSI measure or the 
proximity of the mediator to the independent variable. 
5 Participants also provided information about their risk preferences and attitude certainty. 
Additional information about these data is available from the authors by request. 
6 We used two attention checks. First, participants needed to correctly identify the number and 
identity of their bidding counterparts in the auction for the jar of coins, i.e., bidding against two 
actual bidders. Second, participants needed to correctly respond to at least five (of six) questions 
asking about the images and music they saw and heard in the arousal manipulation. 
7 Image identifiers used in the low-arousal condition were: I95, I181, I182, I587, I590, I595, 
I597, I602, I673, I859, I860, I861, I862, I863 (Kurdi et al.’s (2017) reported arousal: M=1.83, 
SD=.04; valence: M=4.09, SD=.07). Image identifiers used in the high-arousal condition were: 
I306, I322, I328, I440, I473, I475, I477, I479, I496, I535, I676, I727, I827, I849 (Kurdi et al.’s 
(2017) reported arousal: M=4.98, SD=.31; valence: M=3.34, SD=1.42). 
